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While they usually should, people do not revise their beliefs more to expert (economist) opinion 
than to lay opinion. The present research sought to better understand the factors that make it 
more likely for an individual to change their mind when faced with the opinions of expert 
economists versus the general public. Here, across five studies (N = 2,650), I examined the role 
that overestimation of one’s knowledge plays in this behavior. I replicated the finding that people 
fail to privilege the opinion of experts over the public on two different (Study 1) and five 
different (Study 5) economic issues. I then found that undermining an illusion of both topic 
relevant (Studies 2 - 4) and irrelevant knowledge (Studies 3 & 4) can lead to greater belief 
revision in response to expert rather than lay opinion. I suggest one reason that people fail to 
revise their beliefs more to experts is because people tend to think they know more than they 
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 “The whole problem of the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, 
but wiser people so full of doubts” - Commonly attributed to Bertrand Russell 
Are wiser people more doubtful, or does experiencing doubt make one wiser? This is an 
old debate, and thinkers as far back as ancient Greece have weighed in on this fundamental 
question. In the opinion of arguably the wisest man in Greece, Socrates, the feature which makes 
one wise is recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge: “I am wiser than this man, for neither of 
us appears to know anything great and good; but he fancies he knows something, although he 
knows nothing; whereas I do not know anything, so I do not fancy I do.” (Apology, 21d).  The 
key feature of wisdom in the opinion of one great ancient thinker is to recognize what one 
knows, does not know, and adapt behavior to be in line with these limitations.  Experts in a topic 
one is not experienced in may provide a useful measuring stick against which one can compare 
their understanding of a topic. Indeed, the degree to which a person is willing to defer to the 
opinion of experts demonstrates the wisdom that comes with understanding the limits of one’s 
knowledge. Nevertheless, people often disregard the opinion of experts in favor of their own 
unlearned intuition, or the opinion of people similarly unknowledgeable to themselves. That is, 
people should defer more to experts than to lay opinion but, puzzlingly, they don’t (Johnston & 
Ballard, 2016). What underlies this behavior, and more pressingly, how can we help people 
weight the opinion of those with demonstrated expertise more heavily when making decisions? 
The highly specialized world of today should dictate that decisions of epistemic 
authority, choosing when to think for oneself versus deferring to experts, would usually conclude 
with deferring to the proficient (Pierson, 1994). This notion should be especially true when 




2010). People tend to behave, however, in a manner that suggests that experts possess an 
authority on decisions (i.e., how to do things), but not necessarily on beliefs and values (i.e., 
which things to do) (Zagzebski, 2012). For example, people might defer to experts on how to 
efficiently trade with a foreign country, but not on whether that country should or should not be 
traded with. In the latter case people tend to be at most, as equally influenced by opinions of 
professional economists than by the same opinions of the general public (Johnston & Ballard, 
2016). That is, people appear to find the views of their peers just as convincing as those of 
experts when considering how to adjust their beliefs in response to new information. 
Why aren’t experts more influential than the average citizen when it comes to personal 
belief adjustment? One idea is that strongly held beliefs carry feelings of righteousness (Haidt, 
2012) so that not only do people exaggerate the degree to which they have knowledge about a 
topic, they may also believe that they maintain a uniquely privileged moral status by holding 
these beliefs. Any epistemic compromise that may come from deferring to expertise may also 
involve an undermining of their moral position. This causes them to be even less likely to seek 
disconfirming evidence (Haidt, 2012) even beyond the contribution of the well-evidenced 
cognitive bias against disconfirmation (Nickerson, 1998; Stanovich, West & Toplak, 2013). In 
the realm of economics, there has been substantial evidence gathered that suggests that much of 
our economic decision making is actually made along dimensions of morality (Baron, 2018; 
Bhattacharjee, Dana & Baron, 2017; Browne & Milgram, 2008; Taylor, 2014). This creates a 
particular situation where there are both cognitive-epistemic as well as moral reasons a person 
may fail to listen to experts on a particular subject. Given that this intense feeling of being right 
underlies the failure to voluntarily seek out information contrary to one’s personal beliefs, it is of 




when they cannot avoid it. People tend to be motivated skeptics (Kunda, 1990), actively 
searching for and proposing reasons why evidence against their viewpoints may be flawed. This 
is especially true if the experts are perceived to hold ideas that violate their core values (Kahan, 
Jenkins-Smith & Braman, 2011). People may also value protecting their cultural identity (Kahan, 
2015), and wanting to fit in with their associates so much so that they would grant their peers 
(ordinary members of the general population) more influence than professionals. 
Although there is a clear tendency for people to engage in motivated skepticism, this does 
not appear to be immutable, as research suggests that there are conditions under which we may 
overcome these tendencies and behave more objectively (Bolsen, Druckman & Cook, 2014; 
Kunda, 1990). Indeed, it is more likely that motivated skepticism can explain the lack of 
influence experts have only when they are espousing views that clash with values that we hold 
sacred (see Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green & Lerner, 2000). This was further 
supported in Johnston and Ballard (2016), as “hot-button” politicized economic issues led to 
greater rejection of expert opinion than did less-politicized issues. However, even in the 
comparatively mundane topics from a moral perspective, participants nevertheless failed to give 
privilege to the opinion of experts. So, a total rejection of experts cannot solely be explained by 
our tendency to be defensively engaged thinkers. 
 Another potential reason to underappreciate expert opinions is that people overestimate 
their knowledge (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger & Kruger, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; 
Moore & Healy, 2008;). They tend to believe they understand the world around them to a far 
greater extent than they truly do (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox & Sloman, 2013; Fernbach, Sloman, St. 
Louis & Shube, 2013; Keil, 2003; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002) and therefore have little reason to 




knowledge applies to both everyday objects like the mechanics underpinning the function of 
toilets and toasters, and complex social policies like immigration and trade. This effect of 
overestimating the extent to which we understand (and are capable of explaining in detail) 
complicated phenomena has been called the “Illusion of Explanatory Depth” (IoED: Rozenblit & 
Keil, 2002). When asked to explain the mechanics of a process in detail, people are confronted 
with the actual limitations of their expertise through their failure to give a cohesive and complete 
description, this leads to a recalibration of their perceived knowledge through the vanishing of 
the IoED (Fernbach et al., 2012; Keil, 2003). This can have downstream effects such as reducing 
political extremism (Fernbach et al., 2013) or, speculatively, increasing the tendency to privilege 
expert consensus when given an opportunity to change our opinion on a matter of economic 
policy.   
In this research I tested whether overconfidence can explain how people revise their 
beliefs given expert and laymen consensus. I hypothesized that inducing a feeling of ignorance 
might be an efficient method for getting people to rely on more valid sources of information (i.e., 
from experts) over less valid ones (i.e., from the public). In particular, if people believe they 
already understand something to a much greater extent than they really do, they may not 
appreciate the vast difference in expertise between laypeople and experts. Thus, it is possible, 
and I suggest likely, that overconfident participants found the utility of expert opinion to be 
equivalent to that of members of the public. I propose that lowering confidence in perceived 
understanding by exposing an illusion of explanatory depth would increase the perceived utility 
of experts by highlighting the differences between the potential knowledge gap of themselves 
versus a group of experts. I would then expect this to lead to greater belief revision in response to 




 I devised five studies to test the claim that exposing an illusion of knowledge will 
increase the influence of experts. The first study replicated the main finding of Johnston and 
Ballard (2016), that people fail to adjust their beliefs more to expert rather than lay consensus. 
The second study introduced the IoED paradigm that led to greater belief revision in response to 
experts versus lay opinion. The third study replicated the results of the previous and provided 
evidence for the claim that undermining an illusion of even topic-irrelevant knowledge can lead 
to more belief revision in response to expert rather than lay opinion. The fourth study replicated 
this finding across five different economic issues. The fifth study, also using the expanded set of 
issues, included a control condition that again replicated the main finding that people do not 
revise more to experts than to lay people. Compiling Studies 4 and 5 together I find that belief 
revision in response to expert versus public consensus is more than twice as strong when 





Study 1: Replication of Johnston and Ballard (2016) 
I first attempted to replicate the original finding of Johnston and Ballard (2016) that 
people fail to revise beliefs to be more in line with expert opinion, instead preferring the opinions 
of lay people. However, I made an important design change from the original work as I 
implemented a pre-post design to test whether the findings are consistent across a within-subjects 
manipulation. Further, I compiled what was originally tested by Johnston and Ballard (2016) 
across two studies into one. 
Method 
Participants 
I recruited 204 participants via Mechanical Turk who were required to be United States 
citizens above the age of 18 and have a HIT approval rating of at least 90%. No other 
recruitment restrictions were applied. All studies reported in this paper followed this restriction 
criteria. Participants were mostly white (79%), male (60%), had obtained at least some level of 
post-secondary education (83%), and were between the ages of 18 to 69 (M = 33.12, SD = 9.54). 
Procedure 
 The materials, data, and analyses’ syntax can all be found on the Open Science 
Framework here: https://osf.io/2pzbe/. Participants were asked twice for their agreement on two 
different economic statements selected from Johnston and Ballard (2016): a “gold standard” 
statement and a “trade with China” statement. As suggested by the original authors, the key 
distinction between these two statements is the prior beliefs held by participants. Johnston and 
Ballard (2016), found that most of their sample had an opinion regarding the benefit of trading 
with China on the US economy, but few had prior opinions on whether the US should or should 




For the first agreement rating, participants were presented the statement plainly (e.g., 
“Trade with China makes most Americans better off because, among other advantages, they can 
buy goods that are made or assembled more cheaply in China”) and asked to rate their agreement 
on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale with 3 representing uncertainty. They were 
then asked to re-rate their agreement with the statement, however, present during this second 
judgment was “consensus information.” This information was the responses to the same 
statement participants were judging but said to have been made by members with varying 
political preferences of their randomly assigned source (Professional Economists vs. General 
Public). After making this post-consensus judgment, two “trust in economists” questions were 
answered along with demographic questions.  
The economic statements and the levels of consensus used by Johnston and Ballard 
(2016) (and subsequently, by me) were taken from the Initiative on Global Markets’ (IGM) panel 
of economists, consensus on each issue represents the opinions of actual economists and the 
diversity of opinions for each issue is unique (see Supplementary Materials). 
Results 
To test whether participants’ beliefs were revised in accordance with consensus 
information and whether the source of the information mattered, I tested the difference between 
pre- and post-consensus beliefs.1 For the trade with China statement, I found a main effect of 
consensus such that there was a significant increase in agreement with the statement (consistent 
with consensus information) after having been provided consensus information, F(1, 202) = 
15.74, MSE = 0.13, p < .001, np2 = .072 (see Figure 1). However, there was no interaction 
                                               




between source of the consensus and time, F(1, 202) = 0.85, MSE = 0.13, p = .358, np2 = .004. 
Thus, people revised their beliefs after being exposed to consensus information in general but 
failed to revise more to expert than public opinion.  
 
Figure 1. Agreement ratings with the trade with China statement (n =204) before and after 
receiving consensus information. Error bars are +/- 1 SE.  
  
A similar pattern of results was found for the gold standard statement. There was a main 
effect of consensus information, which indicated that people displayed significantly more 
disagreement in their post-consensus beliefs compared to their pre-consensus beliefs, F(1, 202) = 
4.92, MSE = 4.92, p < .001, np2 = .061 (see Figure 2). However, no interaction between source of 
the consensus and time was found, F(1, 202) =2.53, MSE = 0.84, p = .135, np2 = .011. Again, I 







































source of the consensus (expert economists vs lay people) appeared to play no role in their belief 
revision, successfully replicating the results of Johnston and Ballard (2016). 
 
Figure 2. Agreement ratings with the Gold Standard (n =204) statement before and after 
receiving consensus information. Error bars are +/- 1 SE. 
 
Discussion 
 My first study replicated the finding of Johnston and Ballard (2016), that people fail to 
revise their beliefs more to expert than lay opinion. I then turned to answer the question of why 
— why do people behaviorally fail to privilege the opinion of experts over the public? One 
possible reason is that people overestimate how much they know and therefore under value the 
opinions of experts. In other words, they are not revising as much to experts as they would if 
they were less confident in how much they know.  
 My data suggest that people understand the value of experts in an abstract sense (as a 
large majority of the participants reported trusting the opinions of professional economists when 
making their own economic decisions), however, this was not reflected in behavior where they 









































people may be implicitly failing to disqualify themselves as experts. They may aware of the 
value that experts provide but may feel the expertise required to provide this value is not 
discrepant enough between themselves and an expert. That is to say, on these economic issues 
people implicitly consider themselves to be experts. Thus, participants could understand that an 
expert is an expert, but in this case may not believe that the expert holds any specialized 
knowledge above what they themselves have access to. If this is true, then making the difference 
between the topical knowledge of an ordinary individual versus an expert salient to the 
participant should increase belief revision in response to expert opinion. I conducted a second 






People tend to fail to correctly assess how much they really know about how the world 
works. Often, we think we can explain even ordinary phenomenon (e.g., how recycling works) in 
more detail than we really can. When asked to mechanistically explain how something works in 
full detail, however, we become aware of our apparent lack of knowledge, and often experience 
humility at our once overconfident assessment of our knowledge (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). 
Importantly, recognition of our lack of knowledge happens without being provided any external 
feedback on the explanations provided. That is, without being told we don’t know as much as we 
think we do, we realize it entirely by ourselves. Known as the illusion of explanatory depth, this 
paradigm reveals the misbeliefs that many of us have regarding our knowledge of a topic.   
It is this paradigm that was implemented in Study 2 as an attempt to make participants 
more aware of the discrepancy of knowledge between themselves and an expert in economics.  
Method 
Participants 
Three hundred and ninety-nine participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk and were 
mostly white (77%), male (56%), had obtained at least some level of post-secondary education 
(86%), and were between the ages of 18 to 68 (M = 35.36, SD = 10.51). In addition to the 
recruitment restrictions outlined in Study 1, potential recruits were also barred if they had 
participated in the previous study. Furthermore, we limited participation to unique IP addresses 





Study 2 followed a procedure nearly identical to the first, with a few key changes. In this 
study, participants only responded to the trade with China statement. Additionally, prior to 
completing the procedure implemented in the first study, participants completed an illusion of 
explanatory depth (IoED) exercise analogous to Rozenblit and Keil, (2002). Here, participants 
were first asked to rate how well they understood the impact that trading with China has on the 
US economy. This rating was made on a 1 (little understanding) to 7 (thorough understanding) 
scale that participants were provided detailed instructions on how to use. Next, they were asked 
to explain in as much detail as possible how trading with China impacts the US economy. After 
completing the explanation, they reported their self-understanding once again. Following this, 
the remaining procedure of the study was identical to the first study. One final difference was 
that half of my participants were also asked to make the agreement judgment (referred to as “Pre-
writing”) prior to completing the IoED paradigm. That is, half of my participants would make 
three agreement judgments. Following the procedure used by Fernbach et al., (2013), this 
additional judgment was implemented so that I would be able to determine whether or not 
participants who provided a Pre-writing judgment anchored themselves to this initial judgment, 
failing to change their response to it even if they had reported feeling far less knowledgeable in 
the topic of interest. 
Results 
As the manipulation was intended to decrease participants’ confidence in their previously 
held economic beliefs (see Fernbach et al., 2013), I expected those who agreed with the 
economic statement to now agree less, and those who disagreed to agree more with the trade 




distance of one’s opinion from the “uncertain” response for the Pre-writing and Pre-Consensus 
judgments (n = 198).2 Inconsistent with my prediction, there was no significant decrease in 
polarity after being asked to generate a mechanistic explanation, t(197) = 1.12, SE = 0.05, p = 
.132, d = 0.08 [-0.06, 0.22].  
 Next, I tested the effect that exposing the illusion of explanatory depth to participants had 
on belief revision in response to consensus information. I found a main effect of consensus, such 
that people revised their beliefs in response to receiving consensus information, F(1, 396) = 
59.82, p < .001, np2 = .131.3 I also found an interaction between the source of the consensus 
information and time, F(1, 396) = 14.12, p < .001. np2 = .034. Post-hoc analyses revealed that 
people revised their beliefs to both the public consensus (n = 208), F(1, 206) = 9.68, p = .002, 
np2 = .045, and economist consensus (n = 191), F(1, 190) = 54.65, p < .001, np2 = .223, but to a 
far greater magnitude when the information came from professional economists.  
   
                                               
2 Note the n = 198 represents only half of the total sample size because only half of the sample made a Pre-writing 
judgment. 
3 The reported analyses collapses across the pre- and no pre-writing judgment conditions. These reported effects 





Figure 3.  Agreement with the economic issue across Pre-and Post-consensus judgments of the 
Public (n = 208) and Economists (n = 191) conditions. Assessed on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree) scale where 3 represents uncertainty. Error bars are +/- 1 SE. 
 
Discussion 
 In Study 2, I found that after being asked to explain the mechanisms of the economic 
issue they were to give an opinion on, people became far more influenced by the opinions of 
economists. While the participants still adjusted their beliefs to both sources, they did so to a far 
greater extent when presented with economist opinion compared to lay opinion. I also found that 
generating an explanation for how something works led to a reduction in position extremism for 
those who previously agreed with the issue (60% of the sample).  
I generated two competing explanations for why exposing an illusion of knowledge led to 
an increase in receptivity to expert opinion. The first hypothesis suggests that exposure made the 
participants aware of how little they knew about the particular economic issue, that being foreign 





























possessed topic-relevant knowledge. The second hypothesis suggests that exposure induced a 
general feeling of ignorance in the participants, and in turn, made them less convinced of their 
general expertise in any topic. Thus, they would be more influenced by the opinions of experts as 
opposed to opinions of their peers. If the second explanation is true (an induction of ignorance), 
failing to explain any issue would produce a similar willingness to revise one’s beliefs. If the 
first explanation is true (lack of topic-relevant knowledge), however, I should observe no belief 
revision after failing to explain an irrelevant issue (e.g., how modern recycling works). The next 






 This study attempted to replicate the previous study’s findings and to further test whether 
the content of the to-be-explained material in the IoED paradigm mattered. This aims to answer 
the question: Is it necessary to make a participant experience a feeling of ignorance on a specific 
topic (in this case an economics topic)? Or is failing to explain a complicated procedure on any 
topic enough for participants to begin to privilege the opinion of experts? To do so, I added an 
explanation condition where participants would judge their understanding of and explain the 
recycling process in a modern American city rather than the impact that trading with China has 
on the US economy. The issue of recycling was selected as I believed it is a topic that would be 
familiar enough to the subjects to appear superficially simple and lend itself to an overestimation 
of knowledge while being relatively complex in nature.4 
Method 
Participants 
I recruited 401 participants via Mechanical Turk with same restrictions previously used in 
Study 2. Participants could not have completed either Study 1 or 2 to enter this study. 
Respondents were mostly white (77%), male (55%), had obtained at least some level of post-
secondary education (88%), and were between the ages of 18 to 77 (M = 35.96, SD = 11.31).  
Procedure. 
This study’s procedure was nearly identical to that of Study 2’s with two changes. First, 
an unrelated content writing condition was included. This version of the paradigm had 
                                               
4 The issue was also selected as it was thought to be relatively unrelated to the expertise of economists. However, as 
an anonymous reviewer pointed out, this assumption is likely not fair to make and it is certainly possible that expert 




participants report their understanding of and provide an explanation as to how the recycling 
process in a modern US city works. Half of the participants would complete this unrelated 
content writing condition while the other half would complete the experimental content writing 
condition previously used. Second, all participants (rather than half, as in Study 2) would provide 
a pre-writing judgment, that is, an agreement judgment to the economic statement prior to 
completing the IoED paradigm. This granted greater power to detect any difference between 
prior and post manipulation beliefs with little risk as there was no difference in belief revision to 
experts versus lay people dependent on whether they provided this judgment or not. The rest of 
the study remained identical to Study 2. 
Results 
  I first tested whether each explanation task reduced position extremity. To do so I once 
again created “polarity” indexes to measure the average degree of distance from uncertainty in 
Pre-writing and Pre-Consensus judgments. Consistent with my prediction, I found a significant 
reduction in polarity after completing the IoED paradigm, F(1, 398) = 6.33, MSE = 0.62, p = 
.012, np2 = .016. Further, the interaction between writing about a related versus unrelated topic 
was not significant, F(1, 398) < 1, indicating that both writing conditions had a similar effect on 
reducing position extremism.  Thus, I conclude that both explanation conditions were sufficient 
in exposing an illusion of knowledge. 
I then tested whether people revised their beliefs differentially, dependent on both the 
source of the consensus information and what topic they explained and reported understanding 
on. That is, I examined if people gave additional weight to the opinion of experts when put 
through the IoED paradigm as in Study 2, and whether this paradigm was required to be topic-




The three-way Time by Explanation condition by Consensus condition interaction was 
not significant, F(1, 397) < 1 (see Figure 4), indicating that the pattern of belief revision to the 
source of the information was not significantly different across explanations. In other words, 
whether participants rated their understanding of and explained how trading with China impacts 
the US economy or how recycling in a modern American city works, their subsequent belief 
revision to both the public and experts was nearly identical. As such, these explanation 
conditions were collapsed across to provide a higher-powered analysis of whether participants 
revised their beliefs more to experts than to laypeople. 
 
Figure 4.  Agreement with the economic issue of Pre-and Post-consensus judgments of the 
Recycling-Public (n = 92), Recycling Economists (n = 129), TWC Public (n = 105), and TWC 
Economists (n = 75) conditions. Assessed on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) scale 

























Consistent with Study 2, I found a significant Time by Source of consensus interaction, 
such that people revised their beliefs more to expert (n = 204), rather than public opinion (n = 
197), F(1, 397) = 12.96, MSE = 1.98, p < .001, np2 = .031 (see Figure 5). Unpacking this 
interaction revealed that the participants significantly revised their beliefs to experts (in a manner 
consistent with the consensus information), t(203) = 6.97, SE = 0.04, p < .001, d = 0.98 [0.69, 
1.27], while they did not significantly revise their beliefs to laypeople, t(196) = 1.65, SE = 0.04, 
p = .102, d = .11 [-.02,.26]. Once again, after having an illusion of knowledge exposed, 
participants revised their beliefs of an economic issue to a far greater extent when presented with 
the opinions of professional economists than the (same) opinions of the general public. 
 I then examined whether exposing an illusion of knowledge affected the extent to which 
participants weighed expert opinion in belief adjustment. To do this I assessed the difference 
between the subjects’ pre-writing and post-consensus agreement judgments to determine whether 
people’s beliefs at the end of the study were different than they were at the beginning. I found a 
significant Time by Source of consensus interaction, F(1, 399) = 8.76, MSE = 1.91, p = .003, np2 
= .021. Post-hoc analyses revealed that those who received the opinions of experts significantly 
changed their beliefs across time, t(203) = 4.87, SE = 0.05, p < .001, d = 0.68 [0.40, 0.96], while 
those who were provided the opinions of the general public did not, t(196) = 0.53, SE = 0.05, p = 
.597, d = .04 [-.10, .18].  This suggests that exposing an illusion of explanatory depth increases 





Figure 5. Pre-IoED and Post-Consensus judgments split by consensus conditions, Experts (n = 
204) vs. Public (n = 197). Error bars are +- 1 SE.  
 
Discussion 
 This study attempted to replicate the finding of the Study 2 that after attempting to 
explain an economic issue mechanistically, people revise their opinion of that economic issue 
more when they receive consensus information from economists (experts) than when they 
receive consensus of the general public. I also tested whether this finding is explanation relevant, 
that is, whether a person must attempt to explain how that specific issue works or if attempting to 
explain any process would produce the effect of privileging expert opinion. I found that after 
attempting to explain how something works, participants revised their beliefs significantly more 






















mechanistic explanation was about the exact issue (US trading with China) or something not 
related (recycling in a US city). I also found that when given the opinions of experts, people had 
significantly different beliefs at the end of the study than they held at the beginning, but this was 
not the case when public opinion was given instead. Here, after exposure to the IoED people 
were far more likely to change their minds when presented with expert opinion than the opinion 
of the public. I also found that position extremity was decreased after explaining how something 
works, regardless of the topic of that explanation, consistent with the findings of Fernbach et al., 
(2013). 
 This provides further evidence for the explanation that while people recognize 
differences between themselves and experts on an issue, they may not be aware of the 
discrepancy in knowledge between themselves and an expert on the topic. When made aware of 
their lack of topic-relevant knowledge people become far more heavily influenced by experts 
than the general public. However, it is also the case when people are made aware of their lack of 
topic-irrelevant knowledge. I suggest that exposing a lack of knowledge has a more general 
effect that shifts the mental model of what knowledge an expert possesses relative to ourselves 
and leads people to revise their beliefs more in response to expert opinion than the opinion of lay 
people. I refer to this as an induction of ignorance. This may suggest that people maintain a 
feeling that they are generally more knowledgeable than they truly are on all topics, which the 
exposure to the IoED paradigm undermines by making their ignorance directly salient to them. 
A shortcoming of the past two studies employing the IoED manipulation is a lack of a 
true control group to make comparisons between. Thus, I am not able to claim solely based on 
the results of either study that exposing ignorance led to more belief revision than the group who 




whether there was significantly more adjustment to experts than laypeople in the second and 
third studies compared to the first, treating the first study as a control condition. I found a 
significant Time by Consensus Condition by Study interaction, F(2, 997) = 4.99, MSE = 0.77, p 
= .007, np2 = .010. Further probing of this interaction revealed that Studies 2 and 3 each featured 
significantly more belief revision to experts than to laypeople in comparison to Study 1, and 
were not significantly different from each other.5 However, as this test is an internal meta-
analysis of non-pre-registered studies, one should be cautious of interpreting the main finding of 
this paper from this analysis alone (see Vosgerau, Simonsohn, Nelson & Simmons, 2018). As a 
result, the next studies conducted introduced control conditions. 
Another valid criticism of the research so far is the lack of variability in economic issue 
stimuli. That is, thus far I have only shown on one specific issue that inducing a feeling of 
ignorance leads to greater belief revision to expert versus public opinion. I am unable to rule out 
the claim that it is something idiosyncratic to this specific issue. To make a broader claim about 
belief revision to economists versus the public I need to demonstrate the effect across multiple 
economic issues. In addition to a control condition, the next two studies attempt to address this 
problem of stimulus sampling (Wells & Windschitl, 1999). 
  
                                               
5 The three-way interaction was further probed using multiple comparisons. Comparing Study 1 and Study 2, I found 
a significant Time by Condition by Study interaction, F(1, 598) = 8.78, MSE = 1.37, p = .003. Comparing Study 1 
and Study 3, I found a significant Time by Condition by Study interaction, F(1, 601) = 8.15, MSE = 1.18, p = .004. 
Comparing Study 2 and Study 3, I did not observe a significant Time by Condition by Study interaction, F(1, 795) = 
0.07, MSE = 0.01, p = .799. Together, these indicate that the pattern of belief revision to expert opinion found in 
Studies 2 and 3, while not significantly different from each other, were both individually different from Study 1. 





 Studies 4 and 5 were both preregistered via the OSF. The preregistrations can be found 
on the OSF along with the materials and data. 
 To address the concern of stimulus sampling, this study attempted to replicate Study 3’s 
findings across five economic issues. The issues selected were the five issues used in the original 
work by Johnston and Ballard (2016). Further, as it is possible to suggest that the “unrelated” 
explanation condition in the previous study (how recycling works in the US city) is not unrelated 
enough, that is, it is an issue that a professional economist could have a knowledgeable opinion 
on, I changed the topic to be explained. The new unrelated condition would feature a topic used 
in early IoED research: how a helicopter takes flight (Keil, 2003). Also, in an attempt to address 
the issue of no true-control in the last two studies, I included a condition I hypothesized would 
work as a control: explaining why you hold the belief you do about the issue, rather than how it 
works. This method is based off the condition implemented by Fernbach et al., (2013) that used 
it to demonstrate that explaining how rather than why leads to a decrease in political extremism. 
If I find that economic extremism is reduced by how (as demonstrated in the past two studies) 
but not why then this could represent a valid control condition. If explaining why also reduces 
position extremism then it is very unlikely it would produce a belief revision effect discrepant 
from the how conditions. In sum, participants would be explaining either how their one economic 







I recruited 1000 participants via Mechanical Turk for this study. Participants could not have 
completed either Study 1 or 2 or 3 to enter this study. In addition to the recruitment restrictions 
applied for Studies 2 and 3, I also blocked responding from suspicious geolocations associated 
with bot farms via the Turk Prime feature (Litman, Robinson & Abberbock, 2017). Respondents 
were mostly white (70%), of evenly mixed gender (49% male), had obtained at least some level 
of post-secondary education (71%), and were between the ages of 18 to 77 (M = 36.92, SD = 
11.86).  Prior to analysis I excluded 12 participants for either failing to write anything and/or 
failing to respond to any of the three agreement judgments. This left 284 participants in the 
related how condition, 376 participants in the unrelated how condition, and 329 related why 
condition. 
Procedure 
This study’s procedure was nearly identical to Study 3 except the number of possible 
issues participants could provide their opinion about was increased as was the number of writing 
conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three writing conditions that asked 
them to rate their understanding of that issue, and then provide a requested explanation, followed 
by another understanding rating. They would either write about (and rate their understanding of) 
how their economic issue worked (e.g., how trading with China impacts the US economy), why 
they held the position on the economic issue that they did (e.g., why they agree that trading with 
China makes most Americans better off), or how an unrelated issue works (e.g., how a helicopter 
takes flight). Further, participants would be randomly assigned to give their response to only one 




analyses. All participants would make an agreement judgment to the issue three times. Once 
before writing (pre-writing judgment), once after writing (pre-consensus judgment) and once 
after receiving consensus opinion on the issue (post-consensus judgment). As the opinions of 
each economic issue were provided by professional economists, the diversity and levels of 
agreement (and disagreement) for each issue is unique. Thus, I am testing both whether the effect 
holds when the economic issue varies, and whether it holds across differing levels of consensus. 
Further, on two out of the five issues most economists disagreed with the statement (the other 
three they mostly agreed with), allowing us to not only have varying levels of consensus, but 
different directions of consensus, too. Each issue and its respective consensus can be found in the 
materials posted to OSF. 
Results 
Confirmatory analyses 
I first tested whether explaining how but not why reduced position extremity. As the 
manipulation check, I predicted that consistent with prior findings, explaining how something 
works would reduce polarity from the pre-writing to the pre-consensus judgment. However, 
while there was a main effect of writing, F(1, 986) = 7.06, MSE = 0.12, p = .008, np2 = .007, 
there was no interaction F(2, 986) = 0.91, MSE = 0.12, p = .404, np2 = .002. This suggests that 
position extremity was reduced across all writing conditions by a similar amount, contrary to my 
prediction. As a result, one should not expect there to be a difference in belief revision based on 
these writing conditions.   
After writing, regardless of what was written, participants revised significantly more to 
expert opinion than to lay opinion, F(1, 983) = 12.48, MSE = 0.30, p < .001, np2 = .013 (see 




written conditions, F(2, 983) = 0.13, MSE = 0.30, p = .877, np2 < .001. That is, after writing, 
regardless of what was written, participants revised more to expert compared to lay consensus. In 
support of the prediction generated by the manipulation check, writing why failed to produce an 
effect different from the other two writing conditions (related how and unrelated how). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Agreement with the economic issue of Pre- and Post-consensus judgments across the 
three writing and two consensus conditions. Assessed on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly 
Agree) scale where 3 represents uncertainty. Error bars are +/- 1 SE. 
 
The analysis of what I term belief adjustment, the difference between the pre-writing and 
post-consensus judgments, revealed a similar pattern. No differences across writing conditions 
on belief adjustment was found, F(2, 983) = 0.16, MSE = 0.42, p = .852, np2 < .001. However a 
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greater belief adjustment when provided with expert versus lay opinion, F(1, 983) = 6.54, MSE = 
0.42, p = .011, np2 = .007. That is, relative to the first agreement judgment they made, the last 
agreement judgment was in greater line with the consensus opinion when that opinion was said 
to be held by experts compared to the public.  
Discussion 
Across five different economic issues each with a unique level of consensus I replicated 
the finding that explaining leads to greater belief revision and belief adjustment in response to 
expert economist versus public opinion. Further, I provide additional evidence that what is 
explained is irrelevant as even explaining how a helicopter works led to the downstream effect of 
increased belief revision. Importantly, while two of the three questions I attempted to answer 
were resolved, one was left entirely unanswered. As the originally planned written control 
condition failed to produce results discrepant from the experimental conditions on the 
manipulation check it is unlikely that the why condition was a true control condition. In 
retrospect, when queried for reasons why someone holds a position on an economic issue, they 
may start attempting to explain how it works. In complex and technical economic issues like the 
ones presented to participants here, it may be the case that a consideration of “why” will tend to 
reduce to an explanation of “how”. For instance, it would be difficult to find an explanation to 
the question “why do you believe a ship floats on the water” without necessarily appealing to its 
underlying mechanisms. As a result, this may be why the written why condition reduced position 
extremity – because participants were writing about how it works in their natural explanation of 
why they believed what they believe. To explore this possibility I had two independent, 
hypothesis-blind coders read each participant’s explanation and categorized them as an attempt 




know” or wrote nonsense. The results of the coding analysis revealed that the distribution of 
responses between the how and why writing conditions were nearly identical. That is, for one 
coder, 38% of participants in the related how condition explained “why” they believed what they 
believed, and 48% of them explained “how” it worked. This is compared to the 42% who wrote 
“why” they believed it and 43% who wrote “how” it worked in the related why condition.6 This 
is direct evidence that participants found it difficult to specifically write about how something 
worked or why they believed it. Thus, in addition to the main effect of extremism reduction, the 
results of independent coders suggest that the substance of what was being written about in both 
writing conditions was essentially the same thing. Therefore, I treat the why condition in this 
study as a further experimental condition. 
As a result, my control condition question remained unanswered. I decided to run one 
more study focusing on a pure control condition that I intended to collapse with the current study 
to test whether the effect of the manipulation across five issues was different from revision in a 
control condition. 
  
                                               
6 For the other coder while the percentage results are slightly different, the distribution again remains identical 
across the related how and related why conditions. For example, the other coder’s numbers were 51% explaining 
why and 37% explaining how in the related how condition and 51% explaining why and 36% explaining how in the 





 This study attempted to test the main writing condition (explaining how the issue works) 
and a pure writing control task (copying text from a picture). Further, the data collected from this 
study would be compiled with the data from Study 4 in order to provide the best estimate as to 
whether the writing manipulation led to greater belief revision in response to expert opinion than 
the control condition. 
Method   
Participants. 
I recruited 653 participants via Mechanical Turk for this study. In addition to the 
recruitment restrictions implemented in Study 4, potential articipants could not have previously 
completed any of Studies 1 – 4. Respondents were mostly white (75%), an even mix of gender 
(51% men), had obtained at least some level of post-secondary education (67%), and were 
between the ages of 18 to 75 (M = 36.33, SD = 11.06).  Prior to analysis I removed all 
participants who wrote absolutely nothing (1% of the sample). This left 246 participants in the 
experimental condition and 403 participants in the control condition. 
Procedure. 
This study’s procedure was nearly identical to Study 4, except participants would be 
assigned to one of only two writing conditions. In the explanation how condition, like the 
previous study, participants would explain how their economic issue worked. In the control 
condition, participants would copy the text from a descriptive passage that was in image form (to 
prevent copy and pasting). The length of the descriptive passage was approximately equivalent to 
the amount of writing entered for an average written explanation in the previous studies. The rest 






I first tested whether explaining how an economic issue worked compared to copying a 
descriptive passage of text led to a reduction in extremism on the economic issue. Similar to the 
previous studies, I predicted that explaining how something works would reduce polarity from 
the pre-writing to the pre-consensus judgment. In contrast, I expected the control condition to 
have no effect on position extremism between these two judgments. Analyses revealed that there 
was no difference between the writing conditions on polarity reduction, F(1, 647) = 1.51, MSE 
=0 .09, p = .219, np2 = .002. Importantly, however, there was no main effect of Time either, F(1, 
647) = 0.43, MSE = 0.09, p = .513, np2 = .001, suggesting that position extremism was not 
reduced in either the control or experimental condition. While I expected the control condition to 
fail to reduce position extremism (as it did), I did not predict the explanation condition to as well. 
Further, as there were no observed differences in the manipulation check, based on my model, I 
would likely not see a difference in this study between explaining how something works and 
copying text from a text box, although I had originally predicted that I would.  
I then tested whether participants in the control condition revised their beliefs more to 
expert versus lay opinion and whether this difference was distinguishable from the explanation 
condition. I hypothesized that the control condition would replicate the findings of Johnston and 
Ballard (2016) and of my previous Study 1and demonstrate no difference between revisions to 
opinion. The Time by Consensus by Writing condition interaction was not significant, F(1, 645) 
= 0.08, MSE = 0.30, p = .774, np2 = .000. This suggests that, as indicated by the manipulation 




versus the public compared to those in the control condition. Overall, there was an effect of 
greater revision to experts than to the public, F(1, 645) = 5.45, MSE = 0.30, p = .020, np2 = .008.  
For the change in agreement from the pre-writing to the post-consensus judgment, a 
similar pattern of results emerged. The Time by Writing by Consensus interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 645) = 0.01, MSE = 0.70, p = .941, np2 = .000, but there was a Time by 
Consensus interaction, F(1, 645) = 10.47, MSE = 0.37 p = .001, np2 = .016, suggesting that there 
was greater belief adjustment when participants saw economic consensus as opposed to public 
consensus. 
Pre-registered Internal Meta-Analysis 
Next, as stated in the pre-registration, I collapsed across Studies 4 and 5 to provide a 
better picture of the effects across all five issues. This analysis involved collapsing the 
explanation conditions together, creating one condition with 1,250 subjects. Note that this is 
significantly larger than the sole control condition featuring only 400 subjects. I first tested the 
whether the explanation conditions reduced polarity to a greater extent than did the control 
condition. This interaction was not statistically significant, F(1, 1652) = 3.56, MSE = .11, p = 
.059.7 The control condition did not significantly reduce position extremity from the pre-writing 
judgment to the pre-consensus judgment, t(403) = -.97, SE = .02, p = .331, d = -.03 [-.13, .06]. In 
contrast, the experimental condition did significantly reduce position extremity between the pre-
writing and pre-consensus judgments, t(1249) = 2.74, SE = .02, p = .003 d = .08 [.02, .14]. Thus, 
the analyses collapsed across five different economic issues, each with a unique level of 
                                               
7 When comparing the raw data of all of the studies that possess polarity data (studies 2 – 5) a stronger effect 
emerges, F(1, 2452) = 5.19, MSE = .17, p < .001, np2 = .012, though again I caution that this test be only considered 




consensus, demonstrates that exposing an illusion of knowledge reduces position extremism on 
an economic issue.  
I then assessed whether there was a difference between belief revision in response to 
expert versus public opinion. Overall, there was a significant Time by Consensus interaction, 
F(1, 1650) = 9.38, MSE = .32, p = .002, np2 = .006, which suggests that people do revise more to 
professional economists than to the lay public on economic issues. However, the Time by 
Consensus by writing interaction was not significant, F(1, 1650) = .41, MSE = .32, p = .522.8 
This suggests that there was no difference between the control condition and the explanation 
conditions. For exploratory reasons, I decided to unpack the three-way interaction. This 
interaction was not significant for the control condition F(1, 402) = 1.75, MSE = .35, p = .109, 
np2 = .006, but the interaction within the experimental condition was clear, F(1, 1248) = 15.95, 
MSE = .30, p < .001, np2 = .013.9 I do not believe that I had sufficient power to detect the three-
way interaction (or the position extremism three-way interaction) and that displaying the 
interactions within each writing conditions makes the difference in effect between these 
conditions clear. Importantly, the effect size of the experimental condition is more than two 
times larger than it is for the control. Overall, it appears that inducing a feeling of ignorance 
leads people to revise their beliefs more to expert than to public opinion compared to when a 
feeling of ignorance is not induced.  
                                               
8 When comparing the raw data of Studies 2 – 5, a significant three-way interaction emerges, F(1, 2857) = 10.01, 
MSE = .263, p < .001, np2 = .012, revealing that after inducing a feeling of ignorance, people revised more to the 
opinion of experts versus the public compared to when a feeling of ignorance was not induced. I stress the same 
caution on interpretation as in the previous footnote. 
9 While I are aware that some may consider this unpacking statistically inappropriate, I believe not reporting it 
would be inappropriate as I have the power to detect each two-way interaction, but lack the necessary sample to 




Assessing belief adjustment from the pre-writing to the post-consensus judgments, the 
Time by Writing by Consensus interaction was not significant, F(1, 1650) = 0.23, MSE = 0.40, p 
= .633,  np2 = .000. Unpacking this interaction with the same considerations as above, both the 
control, F(1, 402) = 6.61, MSE = 0.37, p = .011, np2 = .016, and the experimental writing 
conditions, F(1, 1248) = 20.40, MSE = 0.41, p = .001, np2 = .009, demonstrate an effect of 
agreement change. This suggests prior to writing to after seeing consensus both conditions 






 My research focused on how people revise their beliefs in response to the opinions of 
experts (professional economists) compared to the general public. Study 1 replicated the finding 
that people adjust their beliefs in response to consensus information but do not adjust more to 
economists’ opinion than lay opinion. Study 2 showed that when exposing an illusion of 
explanatory depth, people became less confident in their beliefs and consequently, revised their 
beliefs far more in response to learning the opinion of experts. Study 3 found that exposing the 
illusion of explanatory depth is not topic-bound and that it may have a more general effect of 
reducing overconfidence by inducing a feeling of ignorance. Study 4 demonstrated the effect of 
the manipulation across five different economic issues each with its own unique level of 
consensus and provided further evidence that it is a general feeling of ignorance (rather than 
awareness of a lack of topic-relevant knowledge) that creates the revision effect. Finally, Study 5 
featured a control condition that also replicated the main finding of Johnston & Ballard (2016) 
and Study 1. When collapsing across Studies 4 and 5, the effect of exposing an illusion of 
knowledge on belief revision in response to expert versus public opinion was more than two 
times stronger than when no illusion is exposed. 
 When making the decision to make up our own minds or defer to experts, why do we fail 
to privilege the opinions of experts over those of the general public? In the realm of economics, 
two factors account for this: moral dilemmas tied to the specific issue and cognitive-epistemic 
reasons. In the present research I held the moral aspect constant and directly assessed whether I 
could improve belief revision in response to experts from the angle of cognitive change. I drew 
from research on overconfidence (see Moore & Healy, 2008), a seemingly ubiquitous 




fail to recognize the knowledge gap that typically exists between themselves and an expert. Such 
behavior would explain why people consistently fail to be persuaded more by economists than 
laypeople on economic issues as found by Johnston and Ballard (2016), and further by Coppock 
(2018). 
 I reasoned that exposing this overconfidence for what it is, an illusion of knowledge, 
could make salient the knowledge gap and lead to greater belief revision in response to experts. 
My findings are consistent with past literature that exposing the illusion of explanatory depth 
leads to downstream psychological effects such as reducing political extremism (Fernbach et al., 
2013), as I too found that extremism (assessed as polarity in my research) was reduced after a 
mechanistic explanation was provided by participants. I also contribute further to the literature 
by demonstrating that undermining the illusion increases receptivity to expert opinion. 
Limitations and Future Research  
 A shortcoming of my research is the lack of a true control condition within one single 
well-powered study. While I do have both a non-preregistered and a pre-registered internal meta-
analysis that both reveal the same finding: belief revision to experts is stronger when an illusion 
of knowledge has been undermined, I do lack the absolute clarity of a definitive one-study test. 
Further, the results of the final study might suggest that people are already revising slightly more 
to experts, contrary to the first study and the work of Johnston and Ballard (2016) and Coppock 
(2018). However, I believe the collective weight of evidence accumulated makes a strong case 
for the interpretation that having an illusion of knowledge punctured leads to greater revision to 
experts versus the public.  
 Another limitation of my research is its generalizability to other fields. The present 




due to the peculiarities of the field of economics, or if these results would generalize to experts in 
other fields such as medicine or law. Future research could look to test the generalizability of 
both the original finding and whether exposing ignorance would produce a similar pattern of 
results. Furthermore, future research should look to extend my results in non-Mechanical Turk 
samples and non-WEIRD populations. 
 Future research may also look to answer the question of whether exposing an illusion of 
knowledge, at least by this manipulation, is necessary to create this effect. If it is true that 
exposing an illusion of knowledge is not necessarily topic bound and it is a general feeling of 
ignorance that is being induced, then surely there are other methods that may produce similar 
results. If researchers are wishing to strive toward a solution that is perhaps more practical to 
implement in an applied setting, then this line of research may be a fruitful endeavor.  
 If wisdom comes with recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge, and the privileging of 
expert opinion indicates that one does recognize these limits, then the results of these studies 
indicate that experiencing doubt can indeed make us wiser. The realization that we know much 
less than we thought seems to trigger a change in behavior which causes individuals to more 
heavily weight the opinion of experts over that of lay people. It seems that without this 
experience of self-doubt many of us too often resemble the self-certain “fools and fanatics” 
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